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THE MEDICAL SOURCEBOOK.

By FRED A. METTLER.

Little, Brown & Company, 1959. Pp. lxviii, 1000.

Boston:

$25.00.

Philip H. Strubing t
The Medical Sourcebook is an extremely valuable volume for the
practicing lawyer. It is offered also as a useful tool for legislators, newspapermen, and lay administrators who may have occasion to deal with
problems having a medical aspect, and presumably it will be equally valuable
to them.
As stated in the preface, the book deals with those aspects of three
sciences-anatomy, physiology, and pathology-which are of particular
importance in the law. In doing so, it goes far beyond the scope of previous medical works designed for use by nonmedical persons. Thus even
the chapters devoted to descriptive anatomy deal not solely with the different parts of the body seriatim, but also, since traumatic accidents usually
damage regions and not isolated parts or systems only, discuss the body in
terms of regions, emphasizing what structures lie together and are in
functional relationship. This approach, coupled with thorough textual
material and illustrations from which confusing fine points of structure
have been omitted, makes the descriptive anatomy chapters unusually
helpful to the lawyer with a "medical" case.
Contributing more to the uniqueness of this work, however, are the
chapters designed to assist the reader in dealing with physicians and
medical literature. Chapter I, rather inaccurately headed "General Considerations," presents a variety of interesting and instructive material on
such subjects as definitions and nomenclature, the medical library, and the
concept and function of the diagnosis in medicine. To one who has never
been exposed to any formal education in medicine, such material comes
as a welcome aid in directing study of particular problems along proper
channels. The author's discussion of psychological factors in injury, preexistence of disability, coincidentalism and contributory cause, accident
proneness, and malpractice will be of particular interest to the attorney in
active practice.
Obviously, the book is a reference work. The author does not purport
and could not hope, in one volume, to give complete and authoritative
answers to particular medical problems. Probably the major contribution
the author makes to medical literature designed for laymen, therefore, is the
t Member, PhiladelphiaBar.
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150-page appendix, entitled "A Guide to the Activities, Personnel, Literature and Societies in the Basic Sciences and Clinical Fields of Medicine."
Its primary value is the excellent bibliography of leading periodicals and
books in each of the recognized fields of medicine. Even if one is already
educated medically beyond the level of the text itself, this bibliography alone
makes the work almost indispensable to any lawyer who, from time to time,
must explore a medical subject in depth. This reviewer knows of no other
single source for such valuable material.
It is impossible, of course, to comment upon or even list all the rewarding information and discussion contained in so large a volume on the
art and science of medicine. It must be said, however, that the author set
himself an ambitious and difficult task-to provide in one volume a reference work which would cover all the fundamental fields of medicine in terms
understandable by the nonmedical reader. That the author has succeeded
becomes apparent on even the most cursory examination of the book.

1961]

BOOK NOTES
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT. By ROBERT J. HARRIS.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv, 172.

$4.00.
Professor Harris has undertaken to compress into a relatively few
pages a historical and evaluative discussion of the political and legal aspects
of the burgeoning doctrine of equality. In most cases, the undertaking has
resulted in a concise and readable treatment; in some instances, however,
the reader might wish that Professor Harris had expended more liberally
his wealth of political knowledge or dug more deeply into the lawbooks.
Beginning with the Stoic philosophers and their proclamation of "the
equality of all men under an all pervasive law of nature" (p. 4), the author
traces briefly the development of the concept of "equal protection of the
laws" through its expression in the Magna Carta to its importation into
colonial America and incorporation into the Declaration of Independence.
Then, more expansively, he relates the stormy, confusing, and generally
inconclusive congressional debates on the fourteenth amendment and
launches into the major theme-the judicial reception, contraction, and
ultimate expansion of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. In
analyzing this judicial treatment from "the distortion of the due process and
equal protection clauses so as to protect property and freedom of contract
against state economic regulation" (p. 56) to "the decision of the Court in
the segregation cases . . . [which] is bound to occupy a prominent place
in constitutional history long after analysts have ceased to write about it
and the strident voices of neonullificationists have been stilled" (pp. 150151), Professor Harris has presented a discussion not only of legal decision but also of legal and political philosophy.
The book is written from the standpoint of a political scientist viewing
the law and not from that of a lawyer viewing politics. It assumes a
familiarity with political history and relies, to some extent, on an analysis
which regards Supreme Court decisions as right or wrong; both practices
may be disconcerting to the lawyer. Thus, it relates the proliferation and
purpose of the "Jim Crow" laws in a mere three sentences (pp. 97-98)
and roundly condemns as erroneous the Civil Rights Cases (pp. 90-91)
and Plessy v. Ferguson (pp. 98-102). Most criticisms, however, have a
positive as well as a negative side, and such condensations and value
judgments may have been necessary and even helpful to a comprehensive
and yet cohesive treatment of the broad principle of equality.
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One conclusion which may be drawn from Professor Harris' survey
of the equal protection clause is that it has generally been the Supreme
Court-not the President nor even the Congress which by virtue of the
fifth clause of the fourteenth amendment holds the power of enforcementwhich has almost exclusively performed the taskwork of implementing the
This observation becomes even more strikequal protection guarantee.
ing when considered in light of the author's demonstration that the early
counterparts of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause were
essentially judicial in direction and nature. In the Magna Carta, "King
John promised: 'To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny right or
justice'" (p. 3); in America, this provision translated in many state
constitutions to a guarantee "that the courts 'shall' be open and that every
person 'shall' have a remedy for injuries done him." (p. 21). That
emphasis on judicial protection has been renewed with unmistakable force
in the six years since the segregation decisions. Congress, in passing the
watered-down Civil Rights Bills of 1957 and 1960 has demonstrated its
political inability to enact strong enforcement legislation; the Executive
has as yet done little to implement and may even have discouraged speedy
integration. But at the same time the Supreme Court, in a series of cryptic
but potent per curiam opinions, has extended the rule of the segregation
cases beyond its enunciated reason-for example, to public parks and
recreational facilities. Despite the resultant criticism and controversy, it
is fast becoming apparent that the federal courts are the best-if not the
only effective--instrument of the national government for achieving the
long-sought goal of equality before the law.

TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THEIR SEPARATE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS.
By ELBERT M. BYRD, JR.

The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.

Pp. x, 276. $5.60.
In the fifteen years from 1940 to 1955, the United States was party
to only 139 treaties as compared with nearly 1,950 published executive
agreements (p. vi)-a ratio demonstrative of the increasing importance
which international agreements other than treaties have assumed in American foreign affairs. In the light of such development, the different types
of international agreements-treaties, congressional-executive agreements,
and presidential agreements-present a challenge for delimitation within
their proper spheres. It is this challenge which Professor Byrd attempts
to meet in his book, Treaties and Executive Agreements in the United
States.
A historical treatment of the powers for regulating foreign affairs is
offered as "conclusive evidence" for two propositions: first, that the Found-
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ing Fathers viewed the treaty power as limited by the prohibitions of the
Constitution; and second, that the treaty power is a substantive rather than
a procedural power that transcends the powers reserved to the states.
(p. 65). The latter premise is further substantiated by an examination
of two treaties made by the Founding Fathers themselves, the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce with France, ratified May 4, 1778, and the Treaty
of Peace with Great Britain of 1783. (ch. 4). The historical evidence,
however, is admittedly inconclusive regarding the perplexing problem of
whether the Senate as a treaty-making agency has power to deal with all
subjects, or whether action by Congress as a whole is desirable for international agreements concerning those subjects specifically delegated to
congressional control. Although the Supreme Court has also failed to
provide an answer to this question, its treatment of executive agreements
and treaties is instructive for probing the foundations of the "inherent
power" theory, which would ascribe to the federal government all international powers which are possessed by other nations. Professor Byrd
argues convincingly against the implications drawn by the adherents of this
theory from the statements of Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland'
2
and of Mr. Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.;
his argument is grounded primarily in the Court's later treatment of the
source of the treaty power in Ex parte Quirin 3 and Reid v. Covert,4 which
declared that all federal powers are derived solely from the Constitution
(pp. 97-98), and in the belief that constitutional limitations imposed on the
treaty power are impotent if an inherent treaty power be deemed to have
an independent existence. (p. 98).
Against this background of historical and judicial development, Professor Byrd proceeds (chs. 6-8) to examine the various types of international agreements, noting the degree of interchangeability among them
and focusing on their limitations, occasion for use, and termination. In a
deceptively simplified approach, he would require that treaties be employed
to consummate international agreements respecting subjects whose control is reserved to the states. (pp. 132-36). Congressional-executive
agreements would encompass those subjects which fall under the powers
delegated to Congress; although in this area such agreements are concededly interchangeable with treaties, the "general rule" is advanced that
both Houses-rather than the Senate alone-should be consulted where
political and practical considerations make a choice possible. (pp. 164-65).
Presidential agreements are understood to mean international agreements
"entered into under the constitutional powers of the President alone" (p.
177) ; to make them valid and effective, the President must have "full power
in his own right to implement the agreement." (p. 178). Such agree1252 U.S. 416 (1920).
2 299 U.S.304 (1936).

34 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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ments would be used, for example, where swift action is needed to meet
sudden changes in world conditions.
Professor Byrd regards the Senator as a "State's Ambassador with
Plenary Powers." (p. 136). The Senator acts "as a national and as a
state legislator at the same time" (p. 141) and in this dual role he is
assigned the "profound responsibility" of balancing the interests of his
state with the welfare of the nation in passing on a treaty. For this reason,
the author concludes, an international agreement should-as a matter of
policy-be submitted as a treaty only when the agreement contains provisions encroaching upon the reserved powers of the state. (p. 191).
In his attempt to confine the scope of the several types of international
agreements, the author has perhaps overstated his case. Although he has
offered many penetrating insights, his approach seems to have compartmentalized an extremely complex and undefined area which may not be
susceptible to such treatment. Perhaps the assertion that a treaty may
deal with any matter of "international concern" 5 provides a more desirable
approach in view of the greater flexibility it affords the treaty power as a
weapon in world politics. However this may be, Professor Byrd's book
serves as a concise introduction into an area which has generally received
less than clear treatment.
5 Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 907 (1959).

